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Abstract
The positive impact that competition has on performance in most industries has 
been questioned in the education sector. The difficulty to measure competition, 
the idea that parents don’t rationally choose schools for their children, and that 
schools do not react to that choice is in the center of the debate. We critically 
analyze the prevailing methodology in the literature that relates competition 
and educational performance, and the data used to estimate that impact. We 
propose a methodology that considers relevant substitutes for each school using 
various attributes which parents consider when choosing schools, and we apply 
it to estimate the effect of competition on educational performance in Chile, 
were more than 90% of the students are covered by a voucher. The evidence 
supports the hypothesis that competition has a positive, statistically significant, 
and economically relevant educational impact on private and public schools.
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Resumen
El efecto positivo que la competencia suele tener en el desempeño en la mayoría 
de las industrias ha sido cuestionado en el sector educativo. La dificultad en 
medir competencia y la idea que los padres pueden no ser racionales al momento 
de elegir escuelas para sus hijos, además que las escuelas no respondan a estas 
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elecciones, son componentes esenciales del debate. Se realiza una evaluación 
crítica de la metodología prevalente para medir la relación entre competencia 
y desempeño. Se propone una metodología que considera a sustitutos relevantes 
de cada escuela, tomando en cuenta los atributos utilizados por los padres en 
la elección de escuela. La evidencia favorece la hipótesis que la competencia 
tiene un efecto positivo, significativo y económicamente relevante en el desem-
peño de las escuelas.
Palabras clave: Vouchers, competencia, desempeño.
Clasificación JEL: I21, L1.
1. Introduction
In the 1980s, Chile transformed its educational system, which was experienc-
ing low academic performance and high dropout rates. This reform introduced 
mass decentralization, placing schools under the management of municipalities, 
and allowed private schools to receive a subsidy through vouchers, which were 
also introduced to finance public schools. A change in the law in 1992 allowed 
parents to complement the voucher provided by the Government generated a 
massive influx of new schools, which, unequivocally changed the competitive 
landscape and has driven a significant reduction in public education to favor 
private subsidized schools (see Paredes and Pinto, 2009). By 2013, the Chilean 
school voucher covered 93% of student enrollment, making it the broadest 
reaching voucher system in the World.1 
The effect a voucher system has on academic performance is a highly contro-
versial topic. The capacity of a voucher system to improve learning depends on 
the ability parents have to choose schools based on quality and on the capacity 
schools have to respond on the incentives competition creates (see Chumacero 
and Paredes, 2012a). To analyze competition, most studies associate competition 
to the number of private schools in a given geographic area, where the areas 
are defined following administrative or geographical criteria (i.e., counties). 
This proxy for competition is misleading when, as in the Chilean case, students 
have the freedom to choose their school, independently of the neighborhood 
where they live. 
Furthermore, estimating the impact competition has on academic results using 
cross-sectional data is also misleading. This method follows classic industrial 
organizational research on the relationship between competition and perfor-
mance (e.g., Bain, 1956; Demsetz, 1973; Keppler, 2008; and Rosado, 2008). 
Cross sectional analysis is correct when, for instance, barriers to entry differ 
across industries in a given moment, and hence there is variance in competition 
across industries. However, this methodology is incorrect when competition does 
not differ in a given moment, as for instance, when the same potential entry 
is present in different “sub markets.” If this were the case, firms would decide 
1 In the past couple of years, several reforms to the voucher system have been proposed 
and implemented.
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entry in the sub markets with higher potential profits, and hence, returns would 
be equal among them.
The change in the competitive environment that affected schools in Chile 
was not the same for each school. In this paper we propose a proxy to correctly 
measure the effect in competitive pressures affecting different schools and we 
evaluate that effect on academic performance. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the educational system in Chile, 
as well as a review of relevant literature. Section 3 describes the methodology 
and the results. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
2. Background
2.1. The Chilean Educational System
Until the early 1980s, nearly 80% of the country’s schools were run by the 
State. The Ministry of Education was in charge of funding and running Chile’s 
schools, supervising and developing curricula, and investing in and building 
public school infrastructure. The system had high dropout and repetition rates, 
and was viewed as delivering a poor-quality education owing to its excessively 
bureaucratic nature, insufficient coverage and failure to provide schools with 
proper incentives.2 This motivated a far-ranging reform of the education system 
based on a voucher system (Friedman, 1962). Chile was one of the first countries 
in the World to introduce a reform of this type, or at least a reform of this scale 
and nature. State-run schools were handed over to the municipalities and were 
financed with subsidies that did not differentiate between students attending 
municipal schools and those attending non-fee private voucher schools (Mizala 
and Romaguera 1998). This reform was in the line of several structural reforms 
in Chile in the late 1970s, including market and choice elements (Castañeda, 
1991; Cox, 2003). Thus, the reform gave rise to three types of schools: (i) mu-
nicipal, State-funded schools (with funding provided by per-student subsidies); 
ii) privately run, State-funded subsidized schools (with funding provided by 
per-student subsidies); and (iii) privately run schools funded by tuition payments. 
Since the early 1980s, the system has gone through numerous modifica-
tions, in response to an analysis to improve quality levels and equality (Cox 
and Lemaitre, 1999). One of such changes was the Program for Educational 
Quality and Equality (MECE), which incorporated a systematic intervention of 
processes and conditions used in education, with an emphasis on the segment 
of students and schools that were falling furthest behind. In 1995 the results for 
the standardized SIMCE tests were published for each institution. This standard-
ized test measures the achievement of educational objectives and is taken by all 
students in 4th grade and 8th grade, with the exception of students who studied 
2 Hanushek (2003) suggests, for example, that in 1970 the test scores for Chile’s students 
were 50% lower than the those of students in France and the United States, 20% lower 
than those of students in Japan and were only 10% higher than students in India and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Barro (1999) reported that Chile’s scores were 50% lower than 
what they would be expected to be, given its level of development. 
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in multi-grade classrooms. Tests for 10th graders were incorporated in 1998. 
The publication of these results was done so parents would have information 
regarding schools’ performance, a key element in making proper decisions. 
In 1993 a provision was introduced to supplement State funding. Under this 
statute, some of the subsidized schools were allowed to charge parents for a por-
tion of the tuition, and subsidized private schools and some public schools were 
authorized to receive donations or grants, which would be deducted from the State 
subsidy. This led to a steep rise in private school enrolment that has cast some 
doubt over the sustainability of the municipal school system (Table 1). These poli-
cies succeeded in bringing about a steep reduction in dropout rates and a steady 
increase in enrolment rates. The scores on the System for Measuring the Quality of 
Education (SIMCE) tests, however, indicate that the quality of education remains 
quite limited and that striking differences between the performances of students 
in different socio-economic sectors continue to pose a major challenge.3 
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BY TYPE
Year Total Municipal Private Subsidized Private Paid
1990 9,811 6,359 2,694 758
1991 9,801 6,346 2,678 777
1992 9,802 6,364 2,651 787
1993 9,831 6,347 2,653 831
1994 9,810 6,313 2,637 860
1995 10,296 6,448 2,790 1,058
1996 10,515 6,527 2,883 1,105
1997 10,318 6,411 2,857 1,050
1998 10,631 6,407 3,065 1,159
1999 10,712 6,367 3,170 1,175
2000 10,610 6,325 3,217 1,068
2001 10,799 6,309 3,459 1,031
2002 10,879 6,248 3,640 991
2003 11,223 6,209 4,084 930
2004 11,296 6,160 4,274 862
2005 11,561 6,168 4,630 763
2006 11,671 6,041 4,897 733
2007 11,763 5,979 5,054 730
2008 11,905 5,917 5,262 726
2009 12,116 5,899 5,536 681
Source: MINEDUC.
The conceptual and empirical foundations underlying this discussion about 
the consequences of the reform clearly extend beyond the specific case of Chile. 
Hanushek (2003) suggests that the cost of public education has risen sharply 
3 Chilean students scored substantially higher on PISA 2006, especially in language. 
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without attaining the expected results. Chubb (2001) contends that, if education 
were privatized, schools would have powerful incentives for cutting costs and 
that this would push them to innovate and become more efficient. Others argue 
that this type of system would prompt private schools to cut costs in ways (e.g., 
recruiting less qualified teachers at lower salaries) that would lower the quality of 
the education that they provide. In addition, this system could lead to discrimina-
tory practices whereby schools would give preference to students that would be 
less costly for them (Levin, 2002). In Hoxby’s view (2000), this kind of situation 
arises because, in a flat-rate subsidization system, subsidized private schools have 
no incentive to take on students who are in more vulnerable situations, since they 
will require a larger investment in order to achieve better scores. 
Regarding the consequences of the Chilean reforms, there is a consensus 
that the reform increased coverage and reduced repetition rates. However, most 
analysts also find low quality of education, and that the results and the intellectual 
ability are strongly stratified and that the level of education is unsatisfactory by 
international standards (see, Heyneman, 1990 and 2004; Brunner, 2005; García 
and Paredes, 2010). 
Besides learning, the literature states a main concern regarding segregation. 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) argue that the reform spurred an exodus of middle-
class students from municipal schools to private subsidized ones, which left the 
municipal schools with a much greater proportion of students from vulnerable 
sectors and therefore drove down their average scores. Tokman (2004) and 
Valenzuela et al. (2008) suggest that allowing parents to pay in a State voucher 
context explains Chile’s high segregation shown in the PISA2006 report. Using 
Simce scores, the same concern is present in Mizala and Torche (2012). More 
recently, Paredes et al. (2013) decomposing segregation within and between 
schools, suggest that most segregation observed is between school types, and 
it is particularly high in the private paid schools. 
2.2. Competition and Performance
The introduction of competition through a voucher system could induce 
schools to improve performance (Hoxby, 2001). Competition among schools is 
expected to increase social welfare when families can choose and school budgets 
depend on family decisions. Pioneering research on the relationship between 
competition and academic performance was done by Borland and Howsen 
(1992) as well as Couch et al. (1993). Using cross section, Borland and Howsen 
(1992) measured the level of competition by the relative participation of private 
schools in the State of Kentucky, finding a positive relationship between this 
and academic performance. Likewise, Couch et al. (1993) measured competi-
tion as the percentage of students who attend private schools and they found a 
positive and significant relationship between the competition provided by these 
private schools and academic performance of public schools in 100 counties in 
the State of North Carolina.
Hoxby (1994, 2000) used a Tiebout (1956) type of model with cross-sectional 
data, which included choices based on the proximity between school and the 
family residence. The model assumed that public schools have access to parental 
information regarding resource productivity. So, including private schools (which 
are assumed to operate with greater productivity) provided information regard-
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ing academic productivity, and limited the agency problem. Results suggest 
that the greater the competition provided by private schools, the greater the 
efficiency of public schools, raising performance levels, teacher salaries and 
high school graduation rates. 
Epple and Romano (1998) develop a theoretical computational model with 
public schools financed by taxes, private schools financed with a voucher system, 
and students with varying abilities and incomes. Their results showed that the 
performance of these schools are explained by the students’ socioeconomic 
factors; they also demonstrated that the voucher system drives private sector 
growth and sorting, which benefits the most qualified students as compared to 
those with lower grades. Romano and Epple (2002) studied a voucher system 
designed to increase competition, without creating student sorting. To achieve 
this, they corrected their prior model, varying the voucher based on students’ 
abilities. The results of this model indicated that a voucher system that recog-
nizes student characteristics can reach higher levels of efficiency, increasing 
quality of results and equality in private and public schools. 
Toma (1996) evaluated the effect of private school enrollment and the 
financing system in five countries. She finds that the public effort to promote 
private enrollment does not reduce the public school performance and that 
the government restrictions on decision making reduced the private school 
performance. Sander (1999), also using a cross-sectional analysis evaluated 
how competition by private schools affect mathematical performance in 
public primary and secondary education in Illinois. The proxy for competition 
used is the percentage of students enrolled in private schools, dealt with the 
endogeneity of this variable by using the density of the Catholic population 
per neighborhood as an instrument, and conclude that competition provided 
by private schools has no direct effect on the performance of public schools. 
Ladd and Fiske (2001) evaluated the effects of the 1991 reform which 
provided complete freedom of school choice and created competitive condi-
tions between primary schools in New Zealand in 1996. They concluded that 
greater competition, measured as the percentage of private schools, negatively 
affected students’ learning, learning styles, relationships with parents and 
relationships with the principals. 
Bayer and McMillan (2005) also focused on the impact of free choice on 
public school performance using information from the 1990 Census for the 
San Francisco Bay area. They developed a more direct measure of competition 
faced by each of the schools, associated with the effect of a reduction in quality 
in the school demand. The authors use as an instrument the price of homes in 
the area where the schools were located. The results showed that competition 
is closely and positively related to academic performance of the schools. 
Braun-Munzinger (2005) conducted a review of 21 voucher programs 
in 14 countries and identified factors which impact the quality of education 
through competition between schools. The main finding is that including the 
greatest number of schools and publishing the results of the school’s tests 
contributed to the proper operation of a voucher program. The factors which 
get in the way of the success of the voucher system are the existence of barriers 
to entry, unequal financing of public and private schools as well as a low rate 
of participation of private schools. Böhlmark and Lindhal (2008) evaluated 
the effects of free choice and competition on the results of private and public 
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schools in Sweden. They defined competition as the number of students in a 
neighborhood who are enrolled in private schools. They found that an increase 
in participation of private schools improved the results of public schools in 
the short term. 
Gibbons et al. (2008) evaluated if the greater availability of schools and 
competition between primary schools in England improved academic results. 
They proxied competition by the Herfindhal index in each zip code area. Initially, 
they did not find any significant relationship between choice, competition and 
academic performance, which they attributed to the endogenous relationship 
between breadth of choice and competition. Then they controlled for endoge-
neity, using as an instrument the maximum distance travelled by the student, 
defined by reveled preferences in different transport modes. They found that in 
the whole sample, competition had a small impact on performance. However, 
when the population is restricted to the population of Voluntary Aided schools 
(schools with more administrative freedom), the results show a positive and 
significant impact on academic performance.
Regarding the Chilean case, Carnoy (1997) suggests that the competition 
model induced by extensive vouchers has not been effective, as reflected in the 
high segmentation in schools. McEwan and Carnoy (2000) using cross-sectional 
data analyzed the impact of competition on the academic performance of fourth 
graders from 1988 to 1996. Competition was proxied by the percentage of 
enrollment in subsidized schools in each neighborhood. The results showed 
that competition had a negative impact on public schools, and that the effect 
is greater in neighborhoods with a higher participation of private subsidized 
schools. The authors contend that this relationship is caused by the migration 
of the best students to subsidized private schools. 
Gallego (2002) develops a model to estimate the effect of competition 
in municipal and subsidized private schools using SIMCE results and cross-
sectional data from 1994 to 1997. He proxied competition as the percentage 
of private enrollment per municipality, and concluded that competition 
improved school results in the case of private subsidized schools. He finds 
a positive correlation between competition and performance, particularly 
in subsidized private schools, and interprets this as being a consequence 
of the existence of stronger incentives for a rapid response to potential 
competition. Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) contend those findings arguing 
that, after the reform, the private subsidized schools’ better showing was 
primarily due to the fact that they had selected out the best students. They 
studied the effects of competition on academic performance in math and 
language in 150 municipalities from 1982 to 1996, defining competition as 
the participation of private schools in each municipality. They found that 
when competition increased, the SIMCE results of the public schools fell, 
but the years of schooling increased. 
Auguste and Valenzuela (2004) evaluated the impact of competition on 
academic results using SIMCE scores for the year 2000. They explicitly as-
sumed that municipalities represent independent markets. The competition 
proxy is, once again, enrollment in subsidized schools by municipality. They 
found that higher competition has a positive but small effect on the SIMCE, 
though an increased inequality of the results and that the segmentation observed 
within municipalities negatively impacted public schools. 
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Chumacero and Paredes (2012b) show the role of information on competition, 
and Gallegos et al. (2016) develop a model with switching costs. In both cases, 
they conclude that those costs limit, but not eliminate, competition. 
3. Methodology
3.1. Incomplete Analogy between Industrial Organization and 
Education 
There is wide agreement that firm’s return is negatively correlated with 
different proxies of competition, particularly, market concentration indicators. 
Whilst the interpretation that associates competition with concentration received 
important criticism, such as Demsetz (1973), who suggests that the relationship 
between concentration and return is spurious when size is not controlled for, 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm that supports it has had large 
impact and tends to be specifically applied by antitrust organizations in dif-
ferent countries (Brozen, 1971; Weiss, 1974; Gilbert, 1984). In fact, that is the 
paradigm implicit in most research analyzing school competition and academic 
performance. A basic industrial organization model to determine the effect that 
competition has on return is:
(1)  Returni, j =α +β Competitioni, j +δ 'Xi, j +ui, j
where the return of firm i in the industry j is measured as the ratio of profits and 
company assets, competition is empirically associated with the industry concen-
tration, X summarizes other controls, and “u” is an error term not related to the 
competition variable. Equation (1) is typically estimated with cross-sectional 
data taking advantage of the variance in competition between industries at a 
given moment of time. The source of that variance is given, for instance, by 
different barriers to entry. 
In the case of education, we are interested in the effect on academic perfor-
mance and not in financial return. This is however a small technicality, since 
a competitive process results in dropping prices to attract customers, schools 
would compete to attract students by providing valuable services, including 
academic performance. Thus, the analogy between the variables of financial 
return and educational performance is clear: to maximize return, each school 
should promote quality, increasing their costs, and reducing return. The com-
petitive pressure will increase costs and academic performance. In short, it is 
plausible that financial return is negatively related to educational performance 
and therefore equation (1) can be estimated by replacing return with academic 
performance (obviously the expected sign for β should be positive).
However, there are two main problems to estimate (1) for the case of educa-
tion in Chile. First, that the competition variable is unclear. School concentration 
indexes in given areas are meaningless when parents move between areas, as 
reported in Chumacero et al. (2011). Second, no variance in return among areas 
should be expected once entry was completed with the reform. Prior to the reform 
the number of schools was institutionally determined at the Ministry level, 
and whilst competition among schools was inexistent, the excesses of demand 
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for each school varied basically depending on the population around schools. 
With the reform, the restrictions for the entry of new schools were lifted. This 
propelled the creation of new schools with no regional or local patterns other 
than to serve the excesses of demand. 
With the reform, schools had to do new things to attract and keep their students. 
Some schools were more prepared to do so, some had market niches because of 
their location, or quality. In general thought, it is likely that after the reform the 
entry of new schools increased competitive pressures and these pressured varied 
among schools. Thus, we test the basic hypothesis that competition increases 
learning considering two periods (prior and post entry) for those incumbent 
schools. Considering two periods, (1) can be empirically expressed as: 
(2)  ∆Perfi,t =α0 +β1∆Compi,t +β2(ΔComp* ST )i,t +β3Perfi,0 +β4ΔControli,t +εi,t
where the dependent variable is the change in the performance in incumbent 
school i in the period t; ΔCompi,t is the change in the competitive pressures 
faced by school i in the period t, Perfi,0 is the initial SIMCE score of school 
i, and ST is the school type; so ΔComp * ST is an interactive variable that 
captures the effect of competition for the different types of schools.4 Equation 
(2) also considers controls for the change in socio demographic characteristics 
(ΔControli,t). We also consider as an instrument of the change in competition, 
the enrollment in the base year. 
3.2. Market Scope and Competition
One of the critical aspects to get a good competition proxy is the definition 
of the market. In general, the literature uses an empirical approach to define it. 
Over a given threshold for cross elasticities among two goods, a market definition 
should include both as part of the same market. In the case of education, two 
schools will be part of the same market if the entry of a new school which charges 
a fee slightly smaller than the incumbent, significantly affects parents’ choice. 
The difficulty to define market in education lies in that relevant school 
characteristics are many. It is in general wrong to define market and the com-
petitive pressures based only in one characteristic, like for instance, distance. 
Substitution depends on all the factors parents consider relevant to choose them 
including infrastructure, academic performance, distance, tuition costs, and on 
the weights they give to each one. 
To define the factors parents consider and the weight given to each of them, 
we follow the school choice model suggested by Chumacero et al. (2011). 
They index i = 1,…, I the students in the sample and j = 1,…, J the possible 
school choices. Denote by xi the vector of characteristics of the student and its 
household that do not depend on the school, by yi the vector of characteristics of 
the school that do not depend on the student, and by zi,j the vector of attributes 
of the school that are specific to each student. Then define ui,j as the (indirect) 
utility of child i attending school j, so that:
4 Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), we considered the SIMCE in the base year as 
a way to test convergence of results between schools over time. 
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(3)  ui,j = u xi ,y j,zi, j( )+εi, j
where u(.) corresponds to a systematic component and εi,j is a (random) non-
systematic component. Given (3), agent i chooses school h if ui,h ≥ ui,j   ∀ j ≠ h .
Let di,j denote the distance between household i and school j; dn,i the dis-
tance between household i and the nearest school; un,i the value of the utility 
function in (3) associated with choosing that school, and um,i the value of the 
utility function associated to the choice of the school that maximizes (3), um,i 
and un,i will coincide.
Finally, define
(4)  vi =
1     if      um,i = un,i
 0      if      um,i > un,i  
where, vi is the (observed) variable that takes the value of 1 when the student 
attends the school nearest to the household and 0 otherwise.
As mentioned by Chumacero et al. (2011), evaluating (4) instead of (3) is 
convenient as now we can focus on modeling the determinants of choosing the 
nearest school using binary response models. Thus, the empirical model to be 
estimated is:
Pr vi =1|wi( ) = F(β
'wi )
where F is a distribution function (say the standard normal), wi is a vector of 
determinants, and β a vector of parameters to the estimated.5 The parameters 
associated to each of the characteristics parents consider in choosing a school, 
define the expected utility associated to each choice. 
For each student in an incumbent school, we compare the indirect utility 
associated with that choice and the indirect utility she would have had if a new 
school had been available. We then define a dichotomous variable Si = 1 if 
Uij
chosen ≤Uij
new , 0 otherwise. Using Si for each student in the incumbent school 
k, the metric for the increased competitive pressure for each incumbent school 
is the proportion of the students in an incumbent school that had been better off 
in a different school had it been available (5).
(5)  Ck =∑Si / n
5 As considered in Ferreyra (2007), the choice of school and of residence may be jointly 
determined. Whilst we have no data to control for the choice of residence, this may not 
be a prevalent problem in Chile because the vast majority of beneficiaries of the voucher 
program are from middle income and low income households. They tend to use publicly 
financed housing programs in which the location of the household is “exogenous” to them. 
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3.3. The Data
We combine 3 data sets to get our results. The Chilean National Socioeconomic 
Survey (CASEN) used by Chumacero et al. (2011) does not allow to estimate 
the competition pressure variable for each incumbent school. In turn, the SIMCE 
database details the academic performance for each student and school, monthly 
tuition and the socio-demographic characteristics of the parents of each student, 
such as gender, family income, education of the father and mother, but does not 
have information on the home address, needed to compute distance to school. To 
get distance, we used the College Entrance Exam (PSU) 2009 database provided 
by The Department of Educational Evaluation, Measurement and Registration 
of the Universidad de Chile (DEMRE), which includes the student’s address 
when he/she took the test at the end of 12th grade. This database was combined 
with the SIMCE tests, which had information regarding the school, the students 
and their families. We assumed that the student lived in the same location in 
2004, as he/she lived in 2009, so we could have a proxy for the distance between 
home and school in 2004.6 
3.4. Results
Table 2 shows the results of a Probit estimation for the school choice model, 
that is, the parameters associated with the different attributes which are valued 
by families when selecting their school. The results are consistent with economic 
theory and empirical evidence obtained in Chumacero et al. (2011) in terms 
that families marginally prefer a closer school in the case of female students, 
but that probability declines with increased family income and increased level 
of education of the mother. When there are more schools which are close to 
the family home, the probability of choosing the nearest school declines. As 
would be expected, families are more likely to choose the nearest school when 
its quality is greater or it is closer. Thus, a trade-off between quality, distance 
travelled by students and the tuition paid is obtained. From the parameters of 
Table 2, we computed the Ck variable as suggested above. 
The estimation of model (2) differentiated the grade when the SIMCE test 
was taken. This is necessary due the uneven entry pattern of new schools and 
the different decisions which are made by parents depending on the age of the 
child.7 The estimation used 2SLS, to face a possible endogeneity regarding new 
school location, is presented in Table 3. 
The results consistently show that greater competitive pressure significantly 
increase the performance of private pay schools and private subsidized schools 
for the 4th and 8th grades, and they show no significant effect for the 10th grade. 
The results suggest the effect is also positive for public schools, but significantly 
smaller (join significance test for the coefficients). Finally, the results show a 
convergence path over time, shown by a negative impact of the initial SIMCE 
6 Whilst some families may move over the years, we don’t expect a correlation between 
the new distance and any independent variable, so our estimates will still be unbiased. 
7 As an example in 2008, there were 8,829 schools teaching 4th and 8th grade, and 3,675 
schools teaching high school. 
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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES ON ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE (2SLS)
   
Variables 
10th grade 8th grade 4th grade
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant –72.7229*
(36.3945)
–118.7656**
(18.7403)
–162.5068**
(9.2809)
Change in competitive pressure 
(range 0 – 100)
0.7502
(0.4448)
2.5540**
(0.2392)
1.0459**
(0.0743)
Change in competitive pressure * 
School Type (Municipal=1)
–0.0269
(0.0229)
–0.7825**
(0.0686)
–0.6605
(0.0468)
Initial SIMCE score of school 0.0301*
(0.0258)
–0.2304**
(0.0264)
–0.8491**
(0.0478)
Income variation 0.0005  
(0.0078) 
0.0369**
(0.0055) 
–0.0028 
(0.0018) 
Tuition variation 0.0532
(0.0673) 
–0.0023
(0.0587)
0.5520** 
(0.0616) 
Variation of mother’s education 3.1124*
(1.4108) 
2.7053**
(0.8382)
1.8055* 
(0.8154) 
Variation of father’s education. 1.8253  
(1.4257) 
5.0632**
(0.8521)
0.3610 
(0.8132) 
Desviaciones estándar entre paréntesis. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Observaciones 599 526 554 
F(7, 592)   1.81 20.71 52.34 
Prob > F 0.0835 0 0 
R- Squared 0.0209 0.2427 0.4345 
coefficient. More relevant, the size of the effect of the competitive pressure vari-
able is quite high. Thus, for example, let’s consider the differentiated impact on 
4th year student performance for two otherwise identical schools. School 1 and 2 
had an increase in the competitive pressure they face by 5 and 15, respectively. 
If both schools were private, that would imply a difference in their performance 
by 10.4 points. In the case both schools were municipal, the differentiated effect 
would be 3.9 points. Considering that the standard deviation of the SIMCE test 
is 50, and that the results have been almost unchanged over the last 10 years, 
these magnitudes are huge.
4. Conclusions
The lack of consensus in the area of education regarding the effect of greater 
competition on learning or performance, contrasts with the results for other 
industries. Using a methodology that introduces the idea and measures com-
petitive pressures, we found that competitive pressures do improve significantly 
and in a relevant way the academic performance of 4th and 8th year students. 
Secondly, we found that the increase in the competitive pressures positively 
affect all schools, regardless of the type of administration. It is true that in the 
case of municipal schools the effect is less important, but still there is an effect 
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which is positive and relevant. Our findings contend some previous ideas, in the 
sense that more competition among schools has significant effects on student 
performance, not only on private schools, but everywhere. 
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